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Numerous researchers have incorporated labor or credit market frictions within simple
neoclassical models to (i) facilitate quick departures from the Arrow-Debreu world, thereby
opening up the role for institutions, (ii) inject some realism into their models, and (iii)
explain cross country diﬀerences in output and employment. We present an overlapping
generations model with production in which a labor market friction (moral hazard) coexists
along with a credit market friction (costly state veriﬁcation). The simultaneous presence
and interaction of these two frictions is studied. We show that credit frictions have a multi-
plier eﬀect on economic activity, by directly aﬀecting investment and indirectly through the
unemployment rate. The labor market friction, on the other hand, aﬀects unemployment
in the short- and long-run but has only a short-run eﬀect on capital accumulation.
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11 Introduction
This paper studies multiple informational frictions in a neoclassical growth model with the ob-
jective of understanding how credit and labor market frictions interact to contribute to persistent
involuntary unemployment and relative income gaps across nations. To that end, we analyze an
overlapping generations economy with production in which a labor market friction (moral haz-
ard) coexists with a credit market friction (costly state veriﬁcation). The simultaneous presence
and interaction of these two frictions is studied. An increase in the severity of credit market
distortions decreases long-run employment, while a worsening of the labor market friction results
in lower income per capita than would obtain otherwise.
Researchers have incorporated labor and credit market imperfections within simple neoclas-
sical models principally to facilitate quick departures from the Arrow-Debreu world thereby
opening up the role for institutions and injecting a healthy dose of realism into their models.
For instance, the role of credit frictions in growth, development, and business cycles has been
highlighted by a number of contributions including Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bencivenga and
Smith (1993), Boyd and Smith (1997, 1998), Huybens and Smith (1998), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) and Azariadis and Chakraborty (1998). Concurrently, another branch of the literature, as
exempliﬁed by Smith (1989, 1995), Bencivenga and Smith (1997) and Jullien and Picard (1998),
has discussed how labor market frictions aﬀect aggregate outcomes. Almost the entire existing
literature, however, treats these frictions in isolation. Yet there is good reason to believe that
credit and labor markets are tightly interlinked and that eﬀects in one market often spill over
into the other, either dampening or amplifying these eﬀects. This paper aims to demonstrate
that the “value added” to considering these frictions jointly is substantial.
The empirical relevance of these aforementioned frictions, not only for poorer countries but
also the richer ones, is well-documented.1 For instance, Jappelli (1990) provides systematic
evidence on widespread credit rationing in a country as ﬁnancially evolved as the US. Evans
and Jovanovic (1989) and Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998) note that the probability of self-
employment depends positively upon whether the individual ever received an inheritance indi-
cating the imperfectness of capital markets. About a ﬁfth of respondents in a 1987 UK survey on
the self-employed rated where to get ﬁnance as their biggest diﬃculty (Blanchﬂower and Oswald,
1998). In recent years, tight credit market conditions in Japan has partially been blamed for the
1Banerjee (2001) provides a comprehensive survey of micro-econometric evidence from developing countries.
Wurgler (2000) ﬁnds developed ﬁnancial markets are associated with a better allocation of capital. In fact,
“although ﬁnancially developed countries might not invest at a higher level, they do seem to allocate their
investment better.”
2lack of employment growth there.2 Rajan and Zingales (1998) use industry-level data to show
how greater credit frictions in Europe, compared to the US, have subdued growth in industries
that are more dependent on external ﬁnance. Similarly, labor market frictions have in recent
years, received ample attention from commentators analyzing the marked rise of European un-
employment over the past three decades (see Rogerson, 2000, for comprehensive and up-to-date
evidence).
T h e r ei ss o m ep e r s u a s i v ee v i d e n c et h a tc r e d i tm a r k e tc o n d i t i o n sm a yh a v es t r o n ge ﬀects on
employment.3,4 Consider the fact that nearly 40% of jobs in the U.S., for instance, are held in
small ﬁrms (those with less than 100 employees) while 58.1% of private sector workers are in
ﬁrms with less than 500 employees (BLS, 2000). Small businesses are also the primary source of
new jobs in the U.S. economy. “From 1990 to 1995, businesses with fewer than 500 employees
accounted for 76.5 percent of net new jobs. But small businesses have a very high turnover rate
compared to large businesses. Over 13 percent of U.S. jobs in 1995 were in ﬁrms that did not
exist before 1990 and over 12 percent of jobs in 1990 were in ﬁrms that had ceased to exist
by 1995” (Berkowitz and White, 2002). These small ﬁrms, the ones most likely to face the
greatest diﬃculties in raising external ﬁnance, therefore contribute signiﬁcantly to job creation
and destruction in the U.S. In the case of Europe, Acemoglu (2000) notes how the fraction of
employment in the most credit-dependent industries has been lower there than in the United
States.5
Our analysis bridges the gap in the literatures on credit and labor market frictions. On the
credit side, we adopt Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig’s (1985) costly state veriﬁcation
2The IMF in its 1999 report on Japan noted: “The drop of business investment over the past two years has been
particularly severe. ...reduced expectations of long-term growth encouraged ﬁrms to cut-back plans for capital
accumulation. Limits on the availability of bank credit also seem to have been a negative factor...expectations of
future earnings have been undermined by a rising unemployment rate and by prospects for further increases in
the period ahead as a number of major corporations have announced employment reduction plans.”
3There is a long tradition in development economics that studies, in partial equilibrium settings, “interlinked
rural markets”, labor markets with or without bonded labor that are operated under the supervision of usurious
(monopolistic) money lenders. See Basu (2000) for an extended discussion.
4The simple correlation between the unemployment rate in 20 OECD countries and the net interest margin
(a measure of credit market eﬃciency, it is the the accounting value of a bank’s net interest revenue as a share
of its total assets) in those countries is about 0.37. The unemployment data are standardized averages from
1991-97 from the OECD, and the net interest margin data are time-averaged over the same period from the Beck,
Demirgkuc-Kunt and Levine (1999) dataset. Note that net interest data likely understate true costs of credit
because they are computed ex post, net of losses on non-performing loans.
5Economic historians too have touched upon similar issues. Williamson (1984) notes that during the British
Industrial Revolution, certain industries like construction contributed heavily to GDP (and employment) and
yet were severely credit constrained by the high interest rates at the time. Hamilton (1999) argues that white
landowners in the South around the time of the Civil War were often so credit strapped that they could not
pay their black slaves any cash wages, and this aﬀected the employment situation and well-being of many black
families at the time.
3approach to provide a clear channel through which borrowing constraints and related distortions
aﬀects investment decisions. On the labor market side, we adapt the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
moral hazard and eﬃciency wages framework.6 We prefer this over an adverse selection model
partly because the empirical relevance of the eﬃciency wage model is fairly well-documented
(Huang et al, 1998), but also because it facilitates a rich and tractable analysis.
In our model, workers suﬀer disutility costs of working and of exerting eﬀort. Firms can
perfectly observe the former but receive a noisy signal about how averse workers are to exert full
eﬀort. Consequently, they hire only those who have ‘low enough’ disutility costs of working, while
others remain involuntarily unemployed. Incentive compatible wage payments are also tailored
to elicit full eﬀort from the employed. Not surprisingly, the higher is the wage rate, the less is a
worker’s incentive to shirk and hence, lower is the unemployment rate. In this scenario, credit
frictions lower wages by hurting capital accumulation, and this tends to exacerbate unemployment
problems.
Labor frictions, at the same time, resonate in the credit market. Since investment projects
are indivisible and subject to idiosyncratic shocks that are not costlessly observed by lenders,
agency costs determine how many potential entrepreneurs obtain loans and produce capital.
More severe incentive problems in the labor market lower employment, and thus, squeeze the
pool of potential capitalists. Additionally, higher unemployment lowers the supply of loanable
funds. On account of both, less investment and capital production per capita is undertaken than
would result in well performing labor markets.
This bi-directional interaction between the two markets is an important new contribution to
the literature. Three papers that present an unidirectional connection and relate most closely
to our work are Betts and Bhattacharya (1998), Acemoglu (2000) and Wasmer and Weil (2002).
Betts and Bhattacharya (1998) study how adverse selection problems in the labor market in the
presence of credit market frictions can lead to complex dynamics, cycles and development traps.
However, in their setup, by virtue of their assumption that all capitalists remain unemployed
and receive a constant “home production output”, wage rates in the labor market really have no
direct eﬀect on the credit market, except through the supply of funds. In contrast, in the current
setup, wages are used as collateral by employed capitalists, and that helps determine the credit
terms and loan rates they receive on the credit market. Wasmer and Weil (2002) model speciﬁcity
in credit relationships, and assume that credit to potential loan-seekers is rationed due to search
6The moral hazard and eﬃciency wage hypothesis is at the center of many papers analyzing labor market
dynamics in the general equilibrium tradition, notably, Danthine and Donaldson (1990), Kahn and Mookherjee
(1987), Coimbra (1996), Gomme (1999), among others.
4frictions. Similarly, search frictions in the labor market produce equilibrium unemployment. In
contrast, our analysis focuses on credit rationing and unemployment as phenomena arising out
of informational asymmetries. Acemoglu (2000) uses a simple model in which Europe and the
U . S .a r ei d e n t i c a lt ob e g i nw i t he x c e p tt h a tc r e d i tm a r k e tf r i c t i o n sa r em o r ew i d e s p r e a di nt h e
former. He goes on to consider the response of these two economies to a common shock, the
arrival of a new set of technologies. The upshot is that the economy with better credit markets
will respond to the arrival of new technologies without an increase in unemployment. In contrast,
in Europe with worse credit markets, the change in technologies can have a persistent adverse
eﬀect on unemployment because, in the absence of eﬃcient credit markets, the agents who need
funds to start up new projects cannot borrow the necessary funds.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline the model envi-
ronment, the preferences, and technology. In Section 3, we study the eﬃciency wage contracts,
and in Section 4, we spell out the details of the credit market contract under the costly state
veriﬁcation problem. The next section contains the general dynamic equilibrium determination
of the capital stock, the loan rates, and the wage rates. It also includes our main interaction
result, the one connecting the severity of the credit market friction with the level of unemploy-
ment. In Section 6, we undertake a comparative study of four models that are nested within our
two-friction model. Section 7 contains a discussion of our main result, some concluding remarks,
and some ideas for future research.
2 Environment
We analyze a production economy inhabited by an inﬁnite sequence of two-period lived overlap-
ping generations, plus an initial old generation. At each date, t =1 ,2,3..., a new generation is
born, consisting of a continuum of agents with mass 1. Thus, the measure of total population at
any date t is 2.
All agents are ex ante identical and endowed with a unit labor time in youth. When young,
an agent may ﬁnd work or remain unemployed. Some of the employed workers subsequently
obtain a production opportunity that enables them to produce capital and become capitalists.
Only the initial old generation is endowed with an aggregate stock of K1 > 0 units of capital.
Following factor market trade and production, at the end of a period, young agents meet
7Ghatak, Morelli, and Sjostrom (2002) study an interesting environment in which the extent of credit rationing
and the type of loan contracts oﬀered, depends on the wage rates in the labor market, via an occupational-choice
decision.
5again in the credit market. As discussed below, at this time young capitalists seek external
ﬁnancing for their projects from young workers. At the start of the following period, returns
are realized (in units of new capital). The old capitalists (ﬁrms) then hire labor and capital to
produce the ﬁnal good, and any loans taken by capitalists for external ﬁnancing of investment
projects are repaid.
In each period, there is a single ﬁnal perishable good in the economy. The ﬁnal good may
be consumed or invested in the production of future capital. This good is produced by ﬁrms
(old capitalists) who have access to a constant returns technology that combines capital, K, with
eﬀective labor, (1 −υ)L, to produce output F(K,(1 −υ)L).H e r eυ is the fraction of employees
that exert no eﬀort or shirk (see below), and L is the total number of employees. To foreshadow,
in equilibrium, ﬁrms will write eﬃciency wage contracts that optimally set υ =0 , that is, they
employ only non-shirkers.
Let kt ≡ Kt/((1 − υ)Lt) denote the capital to eﬀective-labor ratio, and f(kt) ≡ F(kt,1),
denote the associated intensive production function where f satisﬁes f(0) = 0, f0 > 0 >f 00,
and standard Inada conditions. For much of what we do below, we will assume a speciﬁcC o b b -
Douglas form for f,
f(k)=Ak
α,A > 0,α ∈ (0,1). (1)





and the wage rate by




The capital investment technology (project) to which capitalists have sole access is an in-
divisible risky linear stochastic technology in that q>0 units of the ﬁnal good invested in a
project at date t yield zq units of capital at t +1 ,w h e r ez is an i.i.d. (across capitalists and
dates) random variable, which is realized at t +1 .W el e tG denote the probability distribution
of z, and assume that G has a diﬀerentiable density function g with ﬁnite support [0, ¯ z], ¯ z<∞.
We denote by ˆ z the mean of z.
The amount of capital actually produced by a project is private information to the project
owner. Any other agent can perfectly witness the return on that project only by incurring a
ﬁxed cost of γ>0 units of capital.8 This informational asymmetry embedded in the capital
8We follow Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Boyd and Smith (1998) in using this standard assumption.
6investment technology is the source of credit market frictions. Finally, we assume that once the
new capital produced by a project between t and t +1h a sb e e nu s e di nt h ep r o d u c t i o no fﬁnal
goods at t +1 , it depreciates completely.
3 Labor Market Contracts
All agents are risk-neutral and care only about their second period consumption (c2).S p e c i ﬁcally,
we assume U (c2)=βc2, gross of any work-related disutilities (see below). Let St denote an
agent’s saving when young, and let RS
t+1 denote the gross return to saving. For future use, note
that c2,t+1 = RS
t+1St and indirect lifetime utility is simply βRS
t+1St, again gross of work-related
disutilities.
The basic formulation of the labor market closely follows Coimbra (1999) and Jullien and
Picard (1998). Any worker can either work the entire one unit of time or shirk completely.
Workers can choose the level of eﬀort e,w h e r ee = {0,1}.L e t v>0 and a>0 represent
disutilities from being employed and from actually working. We assume that v is identical for all
young agents but that a diﬀers. In particular, a ∼ z(a) with support [a,∞] and a > 0. Utility
from work with full eﬀort (e =1 ) is therefore given by βc2 − (v + a), from shirking (e =0 )by
βc2 − v,a n db yβc2 ≥ 0 if unemployed.
Firms observe a but not a worker’s eﬀort. However, they do receive an imperfect veriﬁable
binary signal, that takes a high or a low value, regarding how much eﬀort a worker has put in.
We let θ denote the conditional probability that the signal takes on a high value even when eﬀort
is zero.
As Jullien and Picard (1998) show, ﬁrms oﬀer a wage contract {ω1 (a),ω 0 (a)} ∈ <2
+ to each
worker of type a,w h e r eω1 (a) is the wage for a high value of the signal and ω0 (a) i st h ew a g ef o r
a low value. Firms want all workers to exert full eﬀort. Therefore, the wage contract is incentive
compatible as long as
βR
S





t+1 (1 − θ)[ω1 (a) − ω0 (a)] ≥ a (4)




t+1ω1 (a) − v − a ≥ 0
⇔ βR
S
t+1ω1 (a) ≥ (v + a). (5)
7This is the worker’s participation constraint.
Assume without loss of generality that ω0 (a)=0 . Then, all unemployment is involuntary, if






which we shall henceforth maintain.
Note that since RS
t+1 is endogenous, the worker’s participation constraint (5) is endogenously
determined too. Agents do not consume in the ﬁrst period of their lives so that workers’ savings
equal their wage income ωt. The incentive constraint (4) binds and therefore,
ˆ at = β(1 − θ)ωtR
s
t+1
holds. Since full eﬀort by any worker produces the same output, each employed worker must
get the same wage, irrespective of their disutility from work, a. Ceteris paribus,a ni n c r e a s ei n
θ (noisiness of the output signal) reduces employment; similarly, an increase in the wage rate is
associated with reduced unemployment.
Proposition 1 (Jullien and Picard, 1998) An optimal labor contract is a triple {ω0(at),ω1(at),
ˆ at} such that (i) ω0(at)=0for all at > ˆ at, (ii) ω1(at)=ωt (see eq. 3) for all at ≤ ˆ at, and, (iii)
all workers with disutility cost of working less than ˆ at are employed and exert full eﬀort.
It follows that total employment is















Similarly, the unemployment rate in the economy is deﬁned by
ut ≡ 1 − z(ˆ at), (8)
and, with a slight abuse of terminology, we shall use the capital stock per young agent to denote
the per-capita capital stock:
e kt ≡ Kt. (9)
84C r e d i t M a r k e t s
We are now prepared to describe the activities of agents in the credit market. After labor
market outcomes are realized and all compensation received, workers are allocated a production
opportunity with probability ϕ ∈ (0,1) as in Khan (2001). This opportunity enables a young
worker to become a capitalist and produce capital using the aforementioned capital-production
technology. By the law of large number, a ϕ fraction of the workers receive this opportunity in
any period.
Under the terms of the labor contracts discussed above, each worker receives a real income
ωt when young. A measure of workers Lt given by (6) ﬁnd jobs, the rest remain unemployed and
receive zero lifetime utility. Among these workers, ϕLt have the potential to become capitalists,
the others simply invest their savings in alternative means.
Following Williamson (1986), we assume without any loss of generality that all lending is
intermediated. In other words, workers who do not receive the capital production opportunity
simply deposit their savings with an intermediary who pools these deposits and makes loans on
their behalf. In addition, following Diamond (1984), intermediaries perform the role of delegated
monitors, verifying project returns as per the terms of loan contracts. We assume that any
lender may establish an intermediary. In equilibrium, with unrestricted entry into the market
for intermediation services, all intermediaries must oﬀer a common competitively determined
deposit return, rt+1, must hold perfectly diversiﬁed loan and deposit portfolios, and must earn
zero proﬁts. In this context, it is important to note that project returns are i.i.d. across capi-
talists, that there exists a continuum of capitalists, and that there is no aggregate randomness.
Consequently, an intermediary with a perfectly diversiﬁed loan portfolio earns a non-stochastic
return on its assets and need not be monitored by its depositors.
4.1 Loan Contracts
The capital investment technology (project) to which capitalists have sole access, is an indivisible
technology that can only be operated at the scale q.9 We assume that all capitalists need some
amount of external ﬁnancing to operate their individual projects. Equivalently, we assume that
Assumption 2
q>ω t
9Boyd and Smith (1998) discuss how the determination of the equilibrium capital stock is unaﬀected by
abandoning the assumption that project scale is ﬁxed at q.
9holds at all dates. All capitalists therefore need external ﬁnancing of the amount
bt = q − ωt > 0.
Potential borrowers, wishing to obtain external funding, announce loan contracts that may be
accepted or rejected by lenders (banks). Borrowers whose contracts are accepted receive external
funding of the amount b after which they operate their projects.
Under this costly state veriﬁcation setup and deterministic monitoring, Gale and Hellwig
(1985) and Williamson (1986) show that optimal loan contracts take a simple form. In particular,
the state space [0, ¯ z] is divided into two subsets At and Bt. For all realizations of z ∈ At,
intermediaries verify project returns for sure. But if z ∈ Bt ≡ [0, ¯ z] − At,n ov e r i ﬁcation occurs.
Let Rt(z) denote the promised real payment per unit borrowed for all z ∈ At.S i n c en ov e r i ﬁcation
occurs on Bt, incentive compatible payments would have to be independent of realizations of z.
Let xt denote this uncontingent payment (per unit borrowed) for all z ∈ Bt.
Intermediaries take the return to be paid on deposits between t and t+1, rt+1,a sg i v e na n d
act as if there is a perfectly elastic demand for deposits at this rate. Hence, they agree to the
terms of such a loan contract only if the expected return on lending is at least as great as rt+1.













g(z)dz is the real expected monitoring cost. In addition, all contracts must be
incentive compatible, that is,
Rt(z) ≤ xt for z ∈ At (11)















Potential capitalists simply maximize their own expected utility by choosing the contractual
obligations optimally subject to the constraints (10)-(13). The solution to this problem is a
standard debt contract. When the capitalist realizes a return z ∈ Bt,h ep a y sxt (principal plus
interest) to the lender. When z ∈ At, he defaults; in this case, the intermediary monitors the
10project and retains the entire proceeds (rental income from whatever capital is produced) net of
monitoring costs.10






z for z ∈ At,

















Using Proposition 2, it is also easy to show the following:
























where the function Φ gives the expected return to the lender as a function of the gross loan rate,
xt, the amount borrowed, bt,a n dt h ef u t u r er e l a t i v ep r i c eo fc a p i t a l ,ρt+1. Following Williamson





















g(0) − G(0) > 0.
Assumption 3 ensures the concavity of Φ,t h a ti s ,Φ11 < 0. In addition, if assumption 4 holds, Φ
is inverse U- shaped. Hence there will be a unique xt depending upon bt/ρt+1 which maximizes












































10Such monitoring or auditing costs can be fairly substantial even in developed countries. For example, Del
Boca and Lusardi (1998) quote a Bank of Italy estimate that it took 5.5 years on average for an Italian bank to
repossess the collateral.









where δ>0 is a constant satisfying
1 − (γ/q)g(δ) − G(δ) ≡ 0.
The object δ has a straightforward implication: the set At is now deﬁned by z ∈ [0,δ).T h a ti s ,
when all potential borrowers are oﬀering the interest rate that maximizes a prospective lender’s
expected rate of return, δ is the critical project return for which a borrower’s project income
exactly covers loan principal plus interest.
4.2 Credit Rationing
In the environment speciﬁed above, it is quite possible to have an unsatisﬁed demand for credit
as originally noted by Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986, 1987a). If all capitalists
want to run their projects at any date t then the total demand for credit (net of internal ﬁnance)
is just ϕ(q − ωt)Lt. Aggregate supply of funds comes from the saving of all employed workers
which is (1 − ϕ)ωtLt. Then a necessary condition for credit rationing to hold for all t is
(1 − ϕ)ωtLt <ϕ(q − ωt)Lt ⇔ ϕq > ωt (16)
If (16) is satisﬁed, there will be credit rationing in equilibrium and





must hold. This implies that under credit rationing, all potential borrowers are oﬀering the
interest rate that maximizes a prospective lender’s expected rate of return. No borrower can
therefore obtain credit by changing the interest rate and other loan terms without reducing the
expected return for all lenders. In this setting, some borrowers must remain unsatisﬁed, or in
other words, credit rationing will obtain in equilibrium. Below, we focus on economies where
rationing occurs at all dates.
The following lemma summarizes information about the payoﬀs to lenders and all funded
borrowers.


























and (b) the expected utility of a funded borrower under credit rationing is given by
ρt+1qφ− rt+1bt,
where






The proof of this lemma follows directly from the arguments in Boyd and Smith (1997, 1998).
It must also be the case that any potential capitalist actually prefers borrowing and operating
his project to simply depositing his income with the intermediary. Boyd and Smith (1998) prove
that a suﬃcient condition for all capitalists to operate their projects using external ﬁnance is
Assumption 5
(1 − α)φq ≥ ψ.
5 General Equilibrium
We ﬁrst analyze the markets for credit and capital in general equilibrium. Equilibrium in the
credit market under credit rationing implies that only a fraction µt < 1 of all capitalists get
external funding at each date t. Each funded borrower borrows an amount bt. Therefore, the
total volume of loans granted is µtϕLtbt. The total supply of savings is the sum of the wage
incomes of employed workers who did not receive a capital production opportunity. These are
the natural lenders of our economy. Additionally, unfunded capitalists also deposit their funds
with an intermediary and, in eﬀect, become lenders. Hence, the total supply of loanable funds
is given by
(1 − ϕ)Ltωt + ϕ(1 − µt)Ltωt. (18)
Equality between the “sources” and “uses” of funds requires that
µtϕLtbt =( 1− ϕ)Ltωt + ϕ(1 − µt)Ltωt (19)
13hold for all t,w h i c hs i m p l i ﬁes to
µtϕq = ωt. (20)
It follows from (16) that µt < 1.
As discussed earlier, there is no aggregate randomness in this economy. Consequently, the
t+1capital stock is (µtϕLt)ˆ zq less the amount of capital spent on monitoring. This monitoring




≡ (µtϕLt)γG(δ). Thus, the equilibrium aggregate
capital stock at t +1is given by
Kt+1 = µtϕLt [ˆ zq − γG(δ)] ≡ µtϕφqLt (21)
Now, using (20), and noting that Lt = z(ˆ at), we can eliminate µt to obtain
Kt+1 = φωtz(ˆ at) (22)











5.1 Stationary and Non-Stationary Equilibria












for a employed worker must equal rt+1 (the return on
deposits that the bank promises) which is computed using (17). Then, the equilibrium capital-






z[β(1 − θ)ω(kt)r(kt+1,k t)]
z[β(1 − θ)ω(kt+1)r(kt+2,k t+1)]
(25)
Equation (25) describes the equilibrium law of motion for kt when credit is rationed at all
dates.11 G i v e na ni n i t i a lv a l u ef o rk1, equation (25) describes the subsequent evolution of any
potentially valid equilibrium sequence {kt}∞
t=2; from such a sequence, it is easy to compute the
11In the lucid prose of Azariadis (1993), “It would not be a gross misrepresentation to say that the business
of modern macroeconomics amounts to “complicating” ..the dynamical system [from the Diamond model] and
exploring what happens as new features are added”. To foreshadow, our results indicate that adding both a
labor and a credit market friction onto the benchmark Diamond model has strong short-run implications but not
necessarily dramatic long-run implications.
14equilibrium sequences for {µt}∞
t=1, {ˆ at}∞
t=1, {ut}∞
t=1 etc. Stationary equilibria are time-invariant
solutions to (25) and are summarized by
k = φω(k) (26)






ˆ at = β(1 − θ)ω(kt)r(kt,k t+1). (28)





Under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology, as in (1), it is easy to show that











ˆ η ≡ αβψ(1 − θ)A.
Rewriting (29), we get








q − (1 − α)Akα
¸1/(1−α)
.
Now using (27) in (30), we get

























15which can be further simpliﬁed to obtain
k
∗ =[ ( 1 − α)φA]
1/(1−α),
ˆ a






Proposition 3 The non-trivial steady-state (k∗,ˆ a∗) is a saddle.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 suggests that the unique equilibrium path of {kt,a t} asymptotically converges
to the stationary equilibrium (k∗,ˆ a∗). Given the initial aggregate capital stock, K1,a n dp e r f e c t
foresight, the initial ˆ a1 is determined such that (k1,ˆ a1),w h e r ek1 ≡ K1/z(ˆ a1), places the economy
on the stable manifold approaching this stationary equilibrium.
5.2 Comparative Statics
We quickly undertake a bunch of comparative statics exercises to illustrate the cross eﬀects of
one friction on the other. The starting point of our analysis is the expression for the steady state
capital-labor ratio derived under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology and using (26):
k
∗ =[ ( 1− α)φA]
1













It is evident that ∂k∗/∂γ < 0 and ∂k∗/∂q > 0.
To investigate the eﬀects of changing parameters, such as γ, on the labor market, recall from
(29) that
ˆ a










or using the deﬁnition of ψ, we have (after simplifying)
ˆ a





















The fact that the labor market friction parameter, θ, does not contribute to the determination
of the steady state capital-labor ratio (see (32)) is noteworthy. It follows (from (20)) that the
labor friction does not aﬀect µ, the fraction of capitalists who receive funding. But this is not
to say that the labor market friction has no eﬀect on any aggregate variables. From (33), it
is apparent that ∂ˆ a∗/∂θ < 0 implying that a worsening of the labor market friction reduces
16equilibrium employment. Consequently, it follows from (22) that the aggregate capital stock
(and the per capita capital stock) falls when the severity of the labor friction increases. Finally,
note that the labor friction parameter, θ,d e ﬁnitely aﬀects short-run e m p l o y m e n t ,a si se v i d e n t
from (29).
The upshot of the previous discussion is that moral hazard in the labor market has short-run
eﬀects on the capital-labor ratio and employment, but no eﬀect on the long-run factor intensity.
In contrast, credit market frictions have both short- and long-run eﬀects. This is easily seen by
considering the eﬀect of increasing the monitoring cost, γ.A ni n c r e a s ei nγ decreases the level
of long-run employment so that credit frictions spill over into the labor market, exacerbating
unemployment problems. The following proposition notes this.





Proof. See Appendix B.
An increase in the monitoring cost increases agency costs (incurred in the form of capital)
and serves to reduce the steady state capital labor ratio. Now, a decline in k∗ raises the marginal
product of capital but reduces wages. Ceteris paribus,al o w e rl e v e lo fe ﬃciency wages can be
sustained in equilibrium only if the unemployment rate is kept fairly high to ‘discipline’ workers.
6 The Underlying Nested Models
The model described thus far in fact nests three diﬀerent models, one where only the labor market
friction is active (as in, say, Jullien and Picard, 1998), one where only the credit market friction is
active (as in, Boyd and Smith, 1998, for example), and of course, the full-information frictionless
Diamond (1965) model. In this section we brieﬂys k e t c he a c ho ft h en e s t e dm o d e l sa n da n a l y z e
their stationary equilibria and stability properties. The purpose is to uncover the exact inﬂuence
of each friction (in isolation) on the models’ deeper features, and eventually compare them to
the model with both frictions.
6.1 Model with Only Labor Friction
In most respects this is the classic Diamond model except that workers are of heterogenous
types and ﬁrms issue eﬃciency wage contracts that keep the shirkers away at the cost of some
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unlike in the classic Diamond model, where Lt/Lt+1 =1for zero population growth. For future
reference, we collect these results:
Lemma 2 The equilibrium law of motion for the capital-labor ratio in the model with solely labor





ˆ at = β(1 − θ)ω(kt)f
0(kt+1), (35)
and the stationary equilibrium is a solution to
k = ω(k). (36)











Thus, equation (34) becomes






18Similarly, from (35) we obtain











































t z(ˆ at). (40)
Equations (39) and (40) deﬁne a non-linear dynamic system in (kt,ˆ at) whose steady-states














Proposition 5 The steady-state (k∗,ˆ a∗) is a saddle.
Proof. See Appendix C.
6.2 Model with Only Credit Friction
We shall next shut down the labor market friction and examine eﬀects of credit market distortions.
As in the standard Diamond model, we will now have full employment, Lt =1for all t.T h e
active CSV friction inﬂuences the return on loans and deposits as deﬁn e di nL e m m a1 :Rt+1 =
ψf0(kt+1)/{q − ω(kt)}. Under our assumption of zero ﬁrst period consumption, using (22), we
can rewrite (21) as






19Lemma 3 The equilibrium law of motion for the capital-labor ratio in the model with solely a
credit market friction is given by
kt+1 = φω(kt) (41)
and the steady state by
k = φω(k).
Lemma 4 Suppose φω0(0) > 1. Then, (41) has a unique asymptotically stable steady state.
6.3 Full-information Diamond model
Straightforward arguments, as spelt out in Azariadis (1993) or von Thadden (1999) reveal that
the law of motion for the capital-labor ratio in the Diamond model is given by
kt+1 = ω(kt) (42)
while the steady state solves
k = ω(k).
Lemma 5 Suppose ω0(0) > 1 and ω00(k) < 0. Then, (42) has a unique asymptotically stable
steady state.
It is useful to contrast the stability properties of the non-trivial stationary solution in the
benchmark Diamond model with that in Proposition 3. The model with both frictions produces
a unique equilibrium path of {kt,a t} that asymptotically converges to the stationary equilibrium
(k∗,ˆ a∗). In contrast, the full-information Diamond model (under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas
technology and so ﬁrst-period consumption) produces a unique globally asymptotically stable
steady state. Adding the two frictions does not fundamentally alter the stability properties
of the steady-states, nor does it contribute to multiple equilibria of the kind that Betts and
Bhattacharya (1998) and Acemoglu (2001) note.
6.4 Model Comparisons
To analyze how each type of friction impacts the long-run and short-run economic behavior, let
us ﬁrst collect information about the stationary equilibria in the four models discussed above.
Deﬁne k∗
D to be the steady state capital-labor ratio in the full-information Diamond model, k∗
L
to be the same in the model with the labor market friction, k∗
C for the model with just the credit
market friction, and k∗
LC, the stationary capital-labor ratio for the model with both frictions.
20Lemma 6 Under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology,
k∗
D =[ A(1 − α)]
1
1−α , k∗




C =[ φA(1 − α)]
1
1−α , k∗
LC =[ φA(1 − α)]
1
1−α ,
where, as deﬁned in Lemma 1,












g(δ) − G(δ)=0 ,
and ˆ z denotes the mean of z.
To facilitate comparisons, we set ˆ z =1and restrict ourselves to φ ∈ [0,1].M o r e o v e r ,n o t e
that when γ =0 ,w eh a v eφ =1 . In this case, all information is eﬀectively public and the
model behaves exactly as the full-information Diamond model. Now compare the steady-state
capital-labor ratios across these four nested economies.




D.T h a ti s ,t h e
long-run capital-labor ratio is lowest for economies with credit market frictions and additionally,
the labor market friction does not aﬀect the long-run capital-labor ratio on its own.































We next compare the extent of credit rationing across two economies, one with just the
credit market friction, and the other with both frictions. Using (20), the fraction of borrowers















LC) ≤ 1.S i n c eω(k∗
C)=ω(k∗
















Corollary 2 T h ee x t e n to fc r e d i tr a t i o n i n g( f r a c t i o no fb o r r o w e r sw h od on o tg e tf u n d i n g )i s
higher in the economy with both frictions than in the economy with only the credit market friction.
21Finally, we turn to a comparison of the steady state unemployment rate deﬁned by u∗ ≡
1−z(ˆ a∗). Comparing unemployment rates is simply a matter of comparing employment z(ˆ a∗)





















Using results from Proposition 4, we note that:
Proposition 7 Long-run unemployment is higher in the economy with both frictions than in the
economy with only the labor market friction.
7 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Our results have a number of interesting implications for the short-run and long-run behavior of
economies. The ﬁrst key prediction follows from Proposition 6. Since the long-run capital-labor
ratio in an economy with labor market friction is identical to that in a frictionless economy,
labor market imperfections do not aﬀect factor intensities across nations. In other words, if we
are to explain persistent diﬀerences in output per worker across nations using our corresponding
steady state variable y∗,d i ﬀerences in credit market eﬃciency would matter more compared to
labor market frictions. In fact, level diﬀerences in y∗ across nations are explained only upto the
parameter composition φ.
It is well-known that, on their own, credit frictions are not substantive enough to explain the
large income dispersions observed across the world (see Azariadis and Chakraborty, 1999, for
instance). We can see this in our model by considering the ratio of y∗ between two nations i and
j which diﬀer only in the parameters governing the distortions, and in particular, share identical












For concreteness, let i denote India and j denote the US; PPP-adjusted relative income per
worker in these countries is about 0.10.12 One measure of credit distortions in our model comes
from observing the gap between lending and deposit rates, since veriﬁcation costs drive a wedge
between these two returns. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the average lending rate for India between
12Output per worker (RGDPQW) for India and the US was respectively 6,216 and 64,537 for 2000 (Penn
World Table, version 6.1).
221974-95 is around 17% and the real interest rate for 1970-95 around 1%, while for the US, the
average lending rate for 1974-95 has been lower at 10% compared to a 1.6% real interest rate
f or 1970-95 [IFC data]. In principle, we coul d use such data on l oan and real i nterest rate
spreads to calibrate the underlying cost parameter γ, and hence, φ. But the problem with such
an approach is that lending rates are heavily managed in poorer countries and estimated returns
at the aggregate level do not trul y capture the degree of distortions. Additionall y, these estimates
are computed ex post, and include losses on non-performing loans.
In fact, more carefully collected evidence (from both formal and informal credit markets) in
the micro-development literature suggests much greater costs of intermediation than the macro-
evidence indicates. For instance, Banerjee (2001, p. 9) notes that, “intermediation costs seem
to eat up at least a third, and often half (and sometimes much more than half) of the income
that would go to depositors”. A quick way to see what such costs might do is to assume that
φi =1 /2 while φj =1(that is, US credit markets are frictionless). With α =1 /3,t h i sd i ﬀerence
in returns implies an income gap of about 0.35, which widens to 0.25 if we allow α to be 1/2.
An alternative way to gauge the impact of credit distortions would be to directly consider











Countries with less widespread access to external ﬁnance are expected to have lower output per
worker. Objective measures of credit rationing are hard to come by, although ﬁrms in transition
and developing countries do identify availability of external ﬁnance as a serious constraint (World
Bank, 2000). But note that even if we were to assume universal access to external ﬁnance in
the US, that is, µ∗
j =1 ,w ew o u l dn e e dµ∗
i for India to be implausibly low at 10% to match an
income gap of 0.10.
While these predicted gaps for y∗ do not come close to observed magnitudes, this is not to
suggest that the welfare eﬀects of better credit markets are insigniﬁcant. Indeed, reducing credit
distortions in a poor country like India to levels similar to that in the U.S. (doubling φi to 1 for
instance) could result in a quadrupling of output per worker! At the same time, in one particular
respect, our computations above underestimate the true impact of distortions: welfare is more
accurately measured by output per capita, e y, instead of the output per worker we have been
using.13
13Data on output per worker and output per capita, for example in the Penn World Table 6.1, are highly
correlated. However, empirical estimates of GDP per worker use the total “economically active population” as a
measure of the workforce, and therefore corresponds more closely to ˜ y than y in our model.
23Our model assumes that unemployed workers produce (and consume) nothing and therefore,
do not contribute to aggregate output. This is a simplifying assumption. More plausibly, consider
am o d i ﬁed environment where the labor frictions are more relevant for formal (manufacturing)
sector employment, while individuals unable to ﬁnd jobs in that sector work in a low productive
informal sector.14 Labor frictions, in this case, result in segmented labor markets which are
at the center of a large body of development literature (see Loayza, 1996 and Maloney, 1997).
Suppose that informal sector output per worker is  <ω (k0), produced at a zero disutility cost
of labor. The steady-state income per capita is given by the weighted average of formal and
informal sector output:15
˜ y




If the rich country j were to have no credit market distortions (hence, no informal sector), the





















Income levels are now aﬀected by both frictions. Labor frictions, in particular, alter the com-
position of aggregate economic activity through u∗, shifting it in favor of the low-productivity
informal sector. At the same time credit frictions have a multiplier eﬀect on the economy: not
only do they directly lower steady-state output in the modern sector (y∗) through lower capital
accumulation, they also result in less formal sector employment (1 − u∗), pushing the economy
into relatively low-return economic activities. To gauge what the two frictions together do, sup-
pose that the informal sector accounts for as much as 50% of employment in country i,t h a ti s ,
u∗
i =1 /2 (u∗
j =0 ).16 Moreover suppose that it is only half as productive as the formal sector,
 i/y∗
i =1 /2. The same output per worker ratio of 0.25 that we predicted above (for the formal
sector under α =1 /2, φi =1 /2 and φj =1 ) now implies an even lower per capita income gap,
about 0.19. Increasing the share of informal sector employment to 70%,w i d e n st h i si n c o m e
disparity to 0.16.
14For instance, one could think of the disutilities of working in the manufacturing sector as arising from a
regimented lifestyle, possible long commutes and extended work-hours.
15Loyaza (1996) reports that informal sector output relative to total GDP (u∗ /˜ y∗) for Latin American coun-
tries range from around 18% for Argentina to nearly 66% for Bolivia.
16The International Labor Organization (2001) reports: “In 17 out of 54 economies studied, employment in
the informal, or related, sectors accounts for more than 50 per cent of total employment in the corresponding
branches of economic activity. These economies include nine in Africa, seven in Latin America, and one in Asia
(Pakistan). The highest shares (more than 70 per cent) were recorded in Gambia, Ghana, Mali and Uganda.”
See ILO (2001) “Key Indicators of the Labor Market”.
24These numbers still do not come close to the large disparities in income per capita we observe
in the world. But credit and labor market frictions jointly seem to explain a signiﬁcant fraction
of these actual gaps, especially since we have not even allowed these frictions to aﬀect technology.
Moreover, our computations suggest that when relative income gaps are modest, credit and labor
market frictions are likely to be more important. The presence of greater credit and labor market
frictions in Europe relative to the US, for example, is well-documented. Our model indicates that
institutional imperfections in these two markets could well account for bulk of the diﬀerence in
living standards in these two regions.
A second key prediction of our model pertains to the short-run eﬀects of labor market frictions.
An exogenous increase in labor market frictions, occurring through θ for instance, increases long-
run unemployment but not the steady-state capital-labor ratio. In the short-run, the higher
unemployment has two eﬀects: it reduces the ﬂow of loanable funds into the ﬁnancial sector, and
lowers returns to capital so that capital accumulation is lower. In the long-run, the aggregate
capital stock adjusts downward to bring back the capital-labor ratio to its previous level.
This also suggests that, for business cycle movements, labor market frictions in conjunction
with credit frictions have the ability to amplify temporary shocks and exacerbate recessions. For
example, consider a one-time (exogenous) adverse shock to the Solow-residual A at time t.T h i s
immediately lowers the wage ωt, and reduces the ﬂow of loanable funds. At the same time, it
lowers borrower net worth, leading to a greater fraction of capitalists being credit-constrained.
T h ec r e d i tf r i c t i o nm a r g i n ,w o r k i n gt hrough borrowing constraints, ampliﬁes the temporary shock
on its own. But the presence of labor frictions worsens the impact: a lower wage rate leads to
greater unemployment, and thereby elicits an even steeper decline in investment.
The importance of information frictions in explaining business cycle movements has been
discussed by a number of authors in recent years, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1994) and Arnold
(2002) being two examples. Our model provides a tractable framework to quantitatively assess
how well these frictions explain observed business cycle movements in investment, employment
and output. It is apparent that the overlapping generations framework adopted here would have
to be abandoned in favor of the inﬁnite-horizon model. As Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) have
demonstrated, the credit friction margin is easily extended to such an environment. Similarly,
Gomme (1999) oﬀers a way to incorporate the shirking and eﬃciency wage model into the inﬁnite-
horizon model. It is conceivable that these settings can be proﬁtably married to study the joint
inﬂuence of the two frictions on variables at the business cycle frequency. This would be an
interesting issue for future research.
25Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 3












T h e s ec a nb es o l v e dt oo b t a i n
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ˆ a∗(ˆ at − ˆ a
∗)
which combined with the steady-state equation gives









w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned the variable ˘ xt ≡ (xt − x∗)/x∗ ≡ ln(xt/x∗).
Linearizing (31) in a similar manner and using, we obtain
f(ˆ a
























ˆ at − ˆ a∗
ˆ a∗ .
Using the deﬁnition of ˆ a∗, this simpliﬁes to
f(ˆ a






































26Equations (44) and (45) deﬁne a two-dimensional linear dynamic system
xt+1 = Qxt
where xt ≡ [˘ kt ˘ at]0 and the Jacobian matrix Q is deﬁned by its elements
q11 =
αq
















Clearly, the trace and determinants of Q are









































Consider now the characteristic equation whose two roots (λ1,λ 2) satisfy
p(λ)=λ
2 − Tλ+ D =( λ − λ1)(λ − λ2)=0 .
Since
p(0) = D>0,
evidently the eigenvalues fall on the same side of 0.
Again, since
p(1) = 1 − T + D






















the eigenvalues must fall on opposite sides of 1. Thus, the steady-state (k∗,ˆ a∗) is a saddle-point
with eigenvalues λ1 > 1 and 0 <λ 2 < 1.¥
B Proof of Proposition 4






q − (1 − α)A(k∗)
α
#
and k∗ =[ ( 1− α)φA]








































































q − (1 − α)A(k∗)
α +
(2α − 1)ψ












Recall ∂k∗/∂γ < 0. Therefore, in order that, ∂ˆ a∗/∂γ < 0 we require the term inside the brackets
to be positive. That is, we require
(1 − α)φq
q − (1 − α)A(k∗)
α +
(2α − 1)ψ




[q − (1 − α)A(k∗)
α]
2 > 0
Recall that ω(k∗)=( 1− α)A(k∗)
















Recall from Assumption 2 that (1−α)φq/ψ ≥ 1.S i n c eq>ω (k∗), the inequality above is always
satisﬁed.¥
C Proof of Proposition 5
To investigate stability of the steady-states, we shall log-linearize the system described by equa-
tions (37) and (38). Equations (39) and (40) deﬁne a non-linear dynamic system in (kt,ˆ at).T h e














To linearize the system, we shall use the approximation that ln(1+x) ' x so that ln(z) ' z−1.
U s i n gt h i sw ec a nw r i t e(zt − z∗)/z∗ =( zt/z∗) − 1 ' ln(zt/z∗) ≡ ˘ zt.
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ˆ at − ˆ a∗
ˆ a∗
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Similarly, linearizing (40) we get
f(ˆ a














































































Equations (46) and (47) can be written in matrix notation as
xt+1 = Qxt.
The elements of the Jacobian Q are
q11 = α
















29The eigenvalues of Q satisfy the characteristic equation
p(λ) ≡ λ
2 − Tλ+ D =0 ,
where























suggesting that the two roots (λ1,λ 2) f a l lo nt h es a m es i d eo f0.
Moreover,

















which implies that (λ1,λ 2) fall on either sides of 1. Hence, we have λ1 > 1 and 0 <λ 2 < 1 so
that the steady-state (k∗,ˆ a∗) is a saddle-point.¥
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